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ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the way in which the strategy and tactics of 
monetary policy are being articulated at present in Europe and other 
countries in a context where price stability has become the primary 
objective of monetary policy and where an increasing number of central 
banks are being given increasing autonomy to pursue this goal . 
Section 2 of the paper documents the increasing adoption of price 
stability as the overriding priority for monetary policy and tries to 
rebuke the main objections that have been raised against this basic 
principle. Having discussed how price stability may be defined, Section 
3 reviews certain strategic decisions about how to achieve it. In 
particular: should there be a quantified, numerical target for price 
stability? If so, who should set it, the government alone , the Central 
Bank alone, or the two in conjunction? Should the government have the 
ability , unilaterally , to override that prior decision, and, if so, through 
what processes? How long should the target period be? Should there be 
a point target, or a band, and, if the latter, how wide? If there is a 
numerical target, will this unduly constrain the ability of the Central 
Bank to react to shocks , either unforeseen demand, or supply , shocks? 
What incentives are there, or should there be, for a Central Bank to 
achieve its announced targets? More broadly, what arrangements have 
been established to make an "independent!! Central Bank accountable 
within the context of a democratic society? Section 4 turns to tactical and 
operational issues and addresses the question of whether central banks 
should use intermediate targets in the pursuit of the final goal of price 
stability or should seek to achieve the later in a direct fashion. In 
addition, it examines the relative strengths and weaknenes of monetary 
aggregates and exchange rates as potential intermediate targets . Finally, 
Section 5 considers certain tactical and operational reforms and 
adjustments that are becoming required in the European Union to prepare 
for the advent of the single monetary policy which will be carried out by 
the European System of Central Banks . 
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
While most Central Banks in Europe, and elsewhere, have been 
giving priority to the achievement of price stability for more than a 
decade, (see Table 1 for a report on the current institutional features of 
Central Banks in" the European Union) 1, in recent years this has been 
reinforced by a marked trend towards giving Central Banks much more 
autonomy to pursue this goal. Both the objective of achieving price 
stability and such autonomy have, in a sizeable number of countries, now 
been constitutionally incorporated in newly revised legislation. In 
countries where no such legislation has been enacted, such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia2, proposals to do so remain very much on the 
present political agenda. 
Such legislative moves towards greater autonomy ("independence") 
have been so widespread and rapid that we thought it worthwhile to try 
to document the present position. We shall concentrate mostly on 
developments in Europe, since this is the region with which we are most 
familiar, but we shall also refer to similar progress in the Antipodes and 
Canada. The same trend towards the enactment of legislation for greater 
Central Bank autonomy is also evident in a number of South American 
countries, such as Chile and Mexico. 
This move towards granting greater Central Bank autonomy reflects 
to spme considerable extent the power of academic ideas whose time has 
come. The time inconsistency hypothesis posits that governments with a 
The Annual Report of the Committee of Governors of European 
Central Banks (1993) contains a detailed comparison of the 
institutional features of the Central Banks of the European Union. 
In the UK, proposals to introduce legislation for Central Bank 
independence were advocated in the Roll Committee Report (1993 ) ,  
and in the House of Commons Select Committee Report (1993); a 
private member's bill to that effect was introduced by Mr N .  
Budgen in February 1994, but the Government prevented it from 
becoming law. In Australia such independence for the Reserve 
Bank was part of the electoral programme of the Liberal Party at 
the 1992 election, but this measure was not supported by the 
victorious Labour Party. 
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high rate of time discount, particularly as elections approach], and a 
natural concern about unemployment, are likely to have a bias towards 
generating a stable, expected rate of inflation, without any beneficial 
effect on real equilibrium (i. e. medium and longer term) values. The 
implication is that more politically subservient Central Banks will have 
less credibility) and that in such countries average inflation will be 
higher. Such theoretical hypotheses have received some empirical 
support from studies of the correlations between Central Bank 
independence and both inflation (negative), and output (zero) (Alesina 
and Summers, 1993; and Cukierman 1992 ) ,  though see Posen (1993) for 
a critique. All this has spawned a large literature, with which we assume 
our readers are familiar, so we do not pursue this further. This subject 
is further discussed in the paper by Debelle and Fischer (1994) also being 
presented at this Conference. 
Perhaps the most successful, and probably the most admired 
Central Bank in Europe, is the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Bundesbank 
has acted as role model for other aspiring European banks, and has acted 
as the leader and contra-inflationary anchor in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. Even without 
academic analytical support for autonomous Central Banks, it is quite 
possible that the prospective European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
whose Protocol was established in the Maastricht Treaty, would have had 
its constitutional independence from government modelled on that of the 
Bundesbank in any case. Moreover, if the ESCB is to be thus 
independent, consistency and logic require that the member national 
Central Banks of the System should adopt the same constitutional 
structure. So, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 5 ,  in Western 
Europe the prospective advent of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has 
provided another impulse towards the revision of Central Bank legislation 
The suggestion that governments would positively seek, and 
Central Banks acquiesce in, a conscious expansion in monetary 
growth, eg prior to elections, is unduly cynical. Instead, the 
focus of political pressure will usually be to defer upwards 
increases in interest rates, or to accelerate their downwards 
movements, to some extent at all times, but especially at moments 
of political sensitivity. 
-10-
in the direction of a stronger and more explicit mandate towards price 
stability, and greater autonomy and independence from government in the 
operation of monetary policy to that end. In Eastern Europe the expected 
date of accession to the European Union, and to EMU within it, is rather 
more distant, but the processes of economic reform that have followed the 
collapse of Communism provide both an occasion and a need for updating 
and revising their Central Bank legislation (see Hochreiter, 1994) . Again 
we take all this as common knowledge. 
What we shall concentrate on in the rest of this paper is the way in 
which the strategy and tactics of monetary policy are currently being 
articulated in this current context. We document in Section 2 the common 
adoption of price stability as the overriding priority. This does not, 
however, prevent the adoption of subsidiary objectives. While price 
stability has now been generally accepted as the dominant objective for 
Central Banks' monetary policy, the term "price stability" has most often 
not been defined, either legislatively or in practice. We shall discuss 
some possible alternative definitions, and the pros and cons of adopting 
them in this Section, e.g. the choice of index and whether the objective 
should be expressed in terms of a price level, or rate of inflation. 
Having thus discussed how the primary objective, price stability, 
may be defined, we review certain strategic decisions about how to set 
about achieving this in the course of Section 3 .  Should there be a 
quantified, numerical target for price stability? If so, who should set it, 
the government alone, the Central Bank alone, or the two in conjunction? 
Should the government have the ability, unilaterally, to override that 
prior decision, and, if so, through what processes? How long should the 
target period be? Should there be a point target, or a band, and, if the 
latter, how wide? If there is a numerical target, will this unduly 
constrain the ability of the Central Bank to react to shocks, either 
unforeseen demand, or supply, shocks? What incentives are there, or 
should there be, for a Central Bank to achieve its announced targets? 
More broadly, what arrangements have been e$tablished to make an 
"independent" Central Bank accountable within the context of a 
democratic society? 
-11-
There are three main concerns frequently expressed about the 
current penchant for mandating independent Central Banks to have 
overriding concern for the single objective of price stability. First, is 
this focus and mandate too narrow? Second, is the delegation of such 
powers to an "independent" agent consistent with the obligations of 
government in a democratic society (another facet of the accountability 
question)? Third, is the transfer of power over monetary policy, by 
itself, to a separate body consistent with the optimal coordination of 
macro-policy instruments, comprising fiscal policy, trade policy, 
exchange rate policy and even incomes policy, as well as monetary policy? 
We then turn to tactical and operational issues in Section 4 .  In 
particular, should Central Banks use intermediate targets in its pursuit 
of price stability, whether, or not, the latter objective has also been 
quantified? If so, what intermediate targets are the main candidates for 
adoption? In practice, there have been two main alternatives: monetary 
aggregates and exchange rates. We discuss the relative advantages, and 
disadvantages, of both, and the operational difficulties of working with 
either intermediate target, or with none at all (Le. using monetary 
instruments directly for the achievement of the final objective of price 
stability) . 
We go on to consider in Section 5 certain tactical and operational 
reforms and adjustments that are becoming required in the European 
Union in order to prepare for the advent of a single monetary policy which 
will be carried out by the prospective ESCB within EMU. While such 
reforms are, perhaps, not strictly a necessary adjunct of the move to 
Central Bank independence and enhanced autonomy as such, this latter 
step within Europe is going hand in hand with preparation for EMU. In 
particular, we review prospective changes in the form of money market 
operations, and assess the likely role of reserve ratios in the context of 
EMU. 
-12-
2. PRICE STABILITY HAS BECOME THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE 
FOR CENTRAL BANKS 
2 . 1  A WIDESPREAD AND RAPID SHIFT OF FOCUS 
In the course of the last five years, since 1989 , there have been a 
large number of revisions to Central Bank legislation (see Table 2) . Such 
revisions in most cases place price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy; indeed having the opportunity to specify that 
requirement in legislation was one of the main reasons for its enactment 
in the first place. This emphasis on price stability contrasts with earlier 
practice. Only in a few cases such as the Bundesbank (and the Swiss 
National Bank) was such legislative emphasis previously placed on price 
stability. In many cases multiple economic objectives were set down, and 
in others no explicit objectives were set. For example, in the case of the 
Bank of England, the Act did not mention what its economic objectives 
should be at all, a lacuna which Governor Towers at the time pointed out 
might represent a weakness for the Bank in arguing policy issues with the 
Government, as turned out to be the case (Fforde, 1992) . 
Given this emphasis on price stability as the overriding, primary 
or, in some cases, sale objective of monetary policy, as laid down in 
(most) recent legislation, it is, perhaps, remarkable that only in a few 
cases (New Zealand and Canada, and the 1993 Swedish White Paper) is any 
definition given of what might be meant by that central concept. If it is 
not clearly defined, then it could be argued that it is more difficult to 
assess how well, or badly, the Central Bank is doing in achieving its 
objective. Moreover there are many possible definitions of price stability, 
and some complex and fine technical issues - e. g. in deciding what index 
to use. So the question of definition has considerable substance, and has 
yet been largely ducked. Nevertheless, though not quantitatively 
defined, most Central Bankers reckon that they can tell qualitatively 
when such stability holds, and they frequently quote Alan Greenspan's 
well-known definition with approval and affirmation. 
At present, only in a few cases - e.g. New Zealand and proposed 
for the UK by the 1993 Roll Report - is the achievement of price stability 
-13-
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(or some synonym) set out in the Act to be the sole macro"'economic 
objective for monetary policy. Usually the requirement is taken to be 
primary, or overriding, in the lexicographic sense that only when this 
objective is achieved can the Central Bank turn to its secondary 
objective(s) . Most recent National Central Bank Act revisions in Europe, 
and the Protocol of the ESCB express this latter objective in a rather 
general fashion: "to support" and carry out its "duties within the 
framework of the Government's overall economic policy". Since the 
requirement to support the overall economic policy of the current 
government might, taken by itself, be held to make the Central Bank 
subservient, the precise terms of the conditionality whereby price 
stability must have first priority, and be achieved before this secondary 
objective can be attempted becomes important. The relevant clause in 
Article 105 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty and in the Protocol for the ESCB 
and member national Central Banks in the ESCB (Article 2) reads as 
follows: 
"Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall 
support the general economic policies in the Community . . .  " 
Besides their macro-objective of maintaining price stability, Central 
Banks also have, to some varying extent· historically, assumed or been 
made responsible for the systemic stability, and the successful workings 
of some central parts of the financial system - e. g. the payments system 
and the commercial banks that operate that system. While in some 
countries it is arguable that these micro-level objectives had historical 
and functional priority relative to the macro-level objective of maintaining 
price stability, there are other countries in which supervisory powers 
over banks (and payments systems) are divided between the Central Bank 
and a separate agency for bank supervision, or even concentrated in the 
latter. The general question of whether such a split of responsibilities 
was beneficial, or not, has recently received much attention in the 
literature (see Bruni, 1993 , especially the paper by Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker in that; Chiappori et aI, 1991 ; and Folkerfs-Laudau and 
Garber, 1992) . This division of views is reflected in the fact that in 
Table 1 three of the Central Banks do not have specific responsibility for 
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the supervision of financial institutions , whereas nine do have such a 
responsibility. 
The shift from the view that monetary policy was but one facet of 
general demand management whose objectives included real, as well as 
nominal, variables, to the view that it should have a single focus,  to 
achieve price stability , has been quite remarkably widespread and rapid . 
It is not , perhaps, surprising that this change in viewpoint has been 
seized on quite enthusiastically by Central Bankers. A multiplicity of 
objectives implies trade-offs and choices which must be inherently 
political, while a single focus, or unambiguous bottom line, facilitates 
Central Banks becoming independent , but accountable, agents of 
Government . But the ideas involved have also been quite widely accepted 
by Governments and political parties of all tendencies . Right-wing 
parties tend to approve of the concept of an independent Central Bank in 
principle, particularly when the alternative is a Central Bank subservient 
to an opposition left-wing Government . Left-wing parties are less keen 
on the concept itself, but recognize that the credibility gain in financial 
markets is important (more so than for right-wing parties) . Accordingly , 
the most favourable condition for enacting Central Bank independence is 
when this is proposed by a left-wing Government and supported by a 
right-wing opposition, as in New Zealand and Spain . Perhaps the most 
telling example is South Africa where the ANC were keen to incorporate 
Central Bank independence in the interim Constitution. Right-wing 
politicians in opposition tend to support Central Bank independence , but 
often become less keen on the idea when in office , as in the case of Mrs 
Thatcher in the UK. 
2.2 A VARIETY OF OBJECTIONS 
Much of the intellectual, academic basis for the case for an 
independent Central Bank has come from. economists, building on the 
concepts of a vertical long-run Phillips curve , rational expectations and 
time inconsistency . Yet there is a sizeable fraction of economists, 
especially various brands of neo- , or post, Keynesians who remain 
unhappy and unconvinced about such analytical concepts. Trying to 
provide an empirical fix for the NAIR U is often a very difficult task (see 
- 16 -
Cote and Hostland for Canada) . Post-Keynesians , and others,  would 
deny either the possibility , or the practical relevance , of "rational 
expectations" .  The suggested behaviour of governments ,  according to 
the time inconsistency argument , has only some rather limited empirical 
backing (Alesina, 1989 ) . Consequently, proposals for mandating Central 
Banks to focus solely on price stability have run into some opposition from 
economists ,  as was , for example , evidenced in Canada (see the Canadian 
Standing Committee on Finance , 1992 Report on liThe Mandate and 
Governance of the Bank of Canada" ) ,  and as discussed Crow ( 1 992 ) .  
Nevertheless there has been, on the basis of casual empiricism, 
relatively little opposition to this general shift to a focus on price stability 
alone . One alternative frequently canvassed in the economic literature has 
been to target nominal incomes, rather than price stability (see, for 
example, Hall and Mankiw , 1993 ) . This has several possible advantages.  
It  gives some weight to  deviations of output from its trend , though as Hall 
( 1986) pointed out the ( one to one) weighting is arbitrary, rather than 
based on considerations of welfare maximisation. Moreover , as Duguay 
( 1994) notes , p . 22 :  
"There is an extensive pre-Keynesian literature arguing in effect 
that stabilization of nominal income would be preferred to price 
stability (Selgin , 1990) . That literature emphasized the two 
arguments of equity and efficiency. It pointed out that the 
transfer of resources between lenders and borrowers or between 
retired and active workers that is associated with cushioning 
supply shocks with price level shifts has the effect of spreading 
the shock more equally across individuals . A price level norm, in 
contrast would shelter lenders and retired workers from adverse 
supply shocks , thus increasing the burden borne by debtors and 
active worker s ;  it would also deny the former the benefits of 
favourable supply shocks . The efficiency argument stressed the 
short-run disruptions in economic activity associated with the 
nominal disturbance involved in maintaining a stable price level. 
Nominal spending targets have been studied extensively in the last 
10 to 15 years . Studies have shown that their adoption could have 
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led to a considerable reduction in the variances of output and 
inflation from historical values; they have also consistently fared 
very well relative to other nominal anchors in terms of weighted 
average of the variances of output and inflation . "  
Yet, despite these arguments for an objective defined in terms of 
nominal incomes rather than price stability alone, the revealed preference 
of most Central Bankers and legislators has been to specify a target 
purely in terms of price stability . Possibly among the considerations 
involved are: (i) the difficulty of estimating potential trend output, and 
hence of deviations from that; (ti) the problems caused by the delays in, 
and revisions to, data on GDP and its real and deflator components ; and 
(iii) the desire to emphasize that monetary policy and Central Banks are , 
or should be,  responsible solely for nominal price variables, and not for 
real variables . Nevertheless, in the short run, in which contracts are 
fixed and expectations set, monetary policy actions do have real 
consequences . How far does this focus on price stability complicate and 
limit the short-run response of Central Banks to shocks of various kinds? 
Simply specifying that there is an error term, a stochastic variable, in the 
aggregate supply function is not of much practical use to Central 
Bankers . 
An argument that is often advanced in these instances is that there 
may be some price level changes ( e . g .  due to supply shocks, such as oil 
shocks) of uncertain duration, whose first-round effect the Central 
Banks may want .to absorb , rather than reverse.  However, several of 
those countries with quantified numerical targets for the RPI/CPI have 
escape clauses in the small print allowing them to disregard certain 
( supply) shocks such as oil/energy/food/terms of trade shocks ( Canada 
and New Zealand) ,  indirect taxes, and the direct effects on the price 
index of interest changes themselves . In the UK· a variety of price 
indices have been developed - e . g .  RPIX and RPIY - which by 
construction exclude those items most subject to supply shocks . Thus , 
through qualifying clauses in the small print the countries with numerical 
targets will usually escape any self-imposed requirement to offset through 
generalised deflation the direct, first round effect of large, specific 
adverse supply shocks . While the possibility of adverse supply shocks 
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affecting raw materials , oil, wheat , etc, is generally acknowledged, the 
likelihood of severe adverse supply shocks to productivity in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy remains more contentious. 
In addition, the relatively long time horizons of the inflation targets 
so far established give some leeway for the Central Banks involved to 
adjust their response to unforeseen supply shocks in the early years of 
the target period. Whether these factors , the small print in the contract 
and the long horizon, give too little or too much room to adjust to 
unforeseen supply shocks, and what might be the expected probability, 
size and form of these latter remain important issues. We all know about 
oil shocks , and harvest failures (and can guard against them in devising 
the precise form of the rule/target) ,  but what form might adverse supply 
shocks take in the manufacturing or services sector? 
Perhaps of more immediate concern, both to Central Banks and to 
politicians , is the question of coordination between policies; specifically 
between the operation of monetary policy, increasingly to be delegated to 
autonomous Central Banks , and the conduct of exchange rate and fiscal 
policies . 
The political authorities have almost invariably t and certainly so in 
the European Union (Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty) , kept 
responsibility for strategic decisions about the exchange rate regime in 
their own hands, although tactical operations are usually delegated to the 
Central Banks (see Table 1 ) .  The potential inconsistency between 
requiring both that the Central Bank achieves domestic price stability and 
also adheres to a fixed exchange rate is , however, widely understood .  
What is less clear is how far the Central Bank from the anchor country in 
a pegged exchange rate system, for example the Bundesbank, or the 
various Central Banks in a system of fuzzy exchange rate target bands 
( e .  g. the G3 under Louvre) ,  should adjust their open market operations 
or interest rates for external, as contrasted with domestic , objectives . 
The question of whether Central Banks can achieve domestic price 
stability ( even if granted complete independence from political control and 
autonomy over interest rate setting) should the government exhibit fiscal 
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irresponsibility remains a matter of both theoretical interest and practical 
concern . Even so , there must be some presumption that the constitutional 
shift to Central Bank autonomy reduces the likelihood of such fiscal 
irresponsibility (because it would be more surely and quickly penalised 
by offsetting interest rate increases, thereby reducing the political 
temptation) . If this is so , then while Central Bank independence may not 
be sufficient for price stability, given an irresponsible Government, it 
mus t be a move in the right direction. 
3. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING PRICE STABILITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given this concentration on "price stability" it is , as we have noted 
in Section 1 ,  somewhat surprising that this term is rarely defined ,  at least 
in the relevant Acts (see Table 2) . In practice, however, Central Banks 
appear to have a clearly revealed preference for the form of target, for 
price stability, that they adopt . In most cases where a numerical target 
has been set, whether jointly or unilaterally by Government or Central 
Bank, this has been defined in terms of a band for the rate of inflation of 
the Retail or Consumer Price Index . For instance, the 1 to 3% objective 
for the CPI agreed between the Government and the Bank of Canada and 
reaffirmed in 1994 for the period 1995-98 (see Freedman, 1994 ) ,  the 0 to 
2% target for the RPI in New Zealand agreed between the Government and 
the Reserve Bank now extending to 1996, and the 1 to 4% target for the 
RPI in the UK set unilaterally by the Government over the period till 
1997. 
In Continental Europe ,  however, since its creation in 1979, the ERM 
has provided the main framework for the pursuit of price stability . Also 
the Central Bank in charge of the anchor currency of the system, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, has had a satisfactory experience with 
intermediate monetary targets, at least until very recently (to be 
discussed in Section 4) , sticking with these while they were being 
progressively abandoned , or downgraded elsewhere. Consequently, 
there has been little experience on the Continent with specific numerical 
targets for inflation, apart from Sweden in the 1930s and now 
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prospectively since 1993 (Persson and Tabellini, 1994) . Thus most of this 
Section discusses issues, lessons and questions arising from the 
experience of Anglo-Saxon countries, Canada, New Zealand and UK who 
have adopted differing forms of such quantified inflation objectives. 
3.2 LEVEL OR RATE OF CHANGE? 
This revealed choice raises questions about why the target was set 
in terms of rates of change, rather than the price level; the use, and 
width, of bands rather than points; the choice of index; horizon; and the 
identity of the target setter, i. e. government and/or Central Bank. 
The first question, of whether to set a target for rates of change 
rather than for levels, was probably largely decided in terms of the initial 
context, of continuing though falling inflation. The objective of 
achieving a given price level during the transition towards obtaining 
virtually zero inflation just seemed too daunting and deflationary. As 
discussed in several recent papers (Lebow, Roberts and Stockton, 1992; 
Scarth, 1993; Fillion and Tetlow, 1993; and Duguay, 1994), there are 
several academic arguments for preferring a target in terms of levels 
rather than rates of change, as an equilibrium condition, after the 
transition to approximately zero inflation has been reached. Since 
bygones are bygones under the latter, the longer term variance, and 
hence uncertainty, about prices is greater . The expectation that an 
unforeseen price change shock will be reversed in due course, once 
credibility in the regime of price level stability has been attained, will 
make the system more self"'stabilising. 
Apart from the decisive argument about one step at a time in 
transition, arguments against moving to a constant price level target 
include the belief/argument that there is a small, but positive, bias in 
estimates of price inflation ... e.g. some 0. 5 / 0. 6% per annum'" due, for 
example, to systematic improvements in goods quality (Crawford, 1993; 
New York Times, 11 January 1994), and that it may be better to err on the 
side of a small positive inflation, rather than an equally small deflation. 
This may be because of some extra rigidity over reducing nominal wages, 
or because the zero lower bound to nominal interest rates makes it more 
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difficult to lower real interest rates at zero, or negative, inflation rates 
(see Lebow, Stockton and Wascher, 1992;  and Crawford and Dupasquier, 
1993 ) . None of these arguments, however, really provides a good case 
for preferring inflation to price level targets, since the latter could be set 
in terms of a constant positive upward trend (with bands perhaps) to take 
account of any argument about bias, lubricant, etc. 
3 . 3  BAND WIDTH? 
As already noted, the inflation target is expressed in terms of a 
band, typically of a 2% or 3% width. This is small relative to the historical 
standard deviation of inflation in most countries, and implies that targets 
could quite often be missed, irrespective of the Central Bank's 
commitment and best efforts. Of course a disadvantage of a point target 
is that it is virtually certain to be missed, and the finer details of the 
extent of that miss may not be readily communicable to the wider public. 
Whether by luck or good management numerical targets in the UK, New 
Zealand and Canada have so far been met; it may be that changing the 
constitutional regime for monetary policy may also change the performance 
of the system. Be that as it may, the selection of band width involves a 
trade-off between the credibility-enhancing effects of choosing a quite 
demanding target and the credibility-damaging effects of failing to adhere 
to it. 
3.4 HORIZON 
Monetary policy, in the guise of changes in interest rates, first 
affects financial variables, asset prices and then after a short lag 
financial flows, next output and finally impinges on generalised current 
goods and services inflation, with this last link involving long and 
variable lags, perhaps some six to eight quarters. Given such lags, a 
numerical target for price inflation, relevant to current monetary policy, 
has to be set some two years at least, or more, into the future. This has 
been the case in the UK, NZ and Canada, with the additional twist that 
the target has been revised (extended in time, but not to date raised) by 
a newly elected Government, as both in NZ with the election of the 
National Party in 1991 and in Canada with the election of the Liberals in 
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1993. Again there is a trade-off between not having the target so close 
that monetary policy hardly has time J given the lags J to affect prices, but 
not so far ahead that it ceases to seem immediately relevant to decision 
makers. Again the consensus seems to be that the minimum initial horizon 
should be at least two years, and the maximum some four or five years 
hence. 
Given the lags involved, the Central Bank will need to know what 
its next target will be before the first expires. So a successor target 
needs to be set for the subsequent period at least a year before the first 
is completed. Nevertheless there is no need for the old target to be 
dropped altogether, once the next target is set. It is desirable, in order 
to maintain accountability, that a Central Bank's success, or otherwise, 
should regularly be assessed in terms of the outcome ,against the 
completed full target objective . The relatively long length of the target 
period allows the Central Bank some flexibility to respond to unforeseen 
shocks in the early years, but the need to meet the final deadline target 
becomes increasingly constraining over time. Remember, however, that 
the small print in many cases allows Central Banks to avoid having to 
offset the direct effect of major adverse supply shocks (beneficial supply 
shocks being an uncovenanted benefit) , while unforeseen demand shocks 
should be offset. Some of those who criticize this policy approach of 
giving overriding priority to price stability do so because they believe 
that it results both in unduly deflationary policy and prevents the Central 
Bank from responding to (downwards) deviations of output from trend. 
Neither extending the target horizon, nor rolling the target forward each 
year (so it is never completed) , would much assuage their- concerns, 
however, while potentially weakening the credibility and commitment of 
the Central Bank to beat inflation. 
3 . 5  WHICH INDEX? 
One of the technically more complex questions is which price index 
to use. Revealed preference to date indicates that this will be the RPI or 
CPI , which is widely used and understood, promptly calculated and rarely 
revised. On all these counts it is preferred to the GDP deflator. 
Nevertheless concern with supply shocks, most likely to emerge in food 
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and energy prices , indirect taxes and the effects on the index of changes 
in interest rates themselves - e . g .  via mortgage payments on housing ­
have led to a variety of alternative versions of the RPI being deployed 
(see the Bank of England Inflation Report in their Quarterly Bulletin) . 
One concern raised by Alchian and Klein (1973) and taken on by Shibuya , 
(1992) ,  Shigehara (1990), Schinasi and Hargraves (1994) and Goodhart 
(1993) is that the RPIjCPI only covers current goods and services flow 
prices ; it excludes any coverage of present changes in the prices of 
future goods and services . When housing and property prices , for 
example, went through their recent cycle of boom and bust , should not 
Central Banks have taken such asset price movement into account in their 
assessment of the underlying rate of inflation? At the Bank of Japan 
Conference (October 1993) when this subject was discussed, the 
consensus was that Central Banks should take asset price movements into 
account , but in a discretionary , qualitative manner, if only because asset 
prices tended to be more flexible than, and hence lead, wages , and goods 
and services prices . But there was little support in that discussion for 
formally incorporating them into an extended price index, in some cases 
because of theoretical objections, but more generally because such asset 
prices were so volatile and noisy, being subject to sharp shifts in tastes 
and preferences . 
3 . 6  WHO SETS? 
An important constitutional issue is who should be responsible for 
setting any quantified numerical target. For the government to do so 
unilaterally , as currently in the UK, underscores the dependent position 
of the Central Bank, and would, therefore , be inconsistent with a 
preference for a more autonomous and independent Bank. But there are 
some well balanced arguments between having the numerical target jointly 
agreed , as in New Zealand and Canada, and allocating that responsibility 
to the Central Bank alone . It was one of the key subjects of discussion 
in the Roll Committee Report in the UK, which finally came down in favour 
of having the Central Bank set its own targets unilaterally for itself, 
largely on the grounds of the potential time inconsistency of politicians ; 
thus the Report states that: 
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n we believe that UK monetary policy needs greater 
independence than can be achieved through any system in which 
ministers have operational responsibility for framing targets . Our 
design attempts to achieve this by assigning ultimate responsibility 
for choice of targets to the Bank alone (though of course it would 
discuss , and normally agree , those with Ministers) , and by leaning 
as heavily as we can on transparency in two ways . First , although 
the government and Bank could announce that they believed 
different target ranges for inflation appropriate at any particular 
time , itself a signal likely to place government policy under close 
public scrutiny , the only recourse to a government determined to 
have its way would be the highly visible step of suspending the 
Bank's sale objective; the Bank could not be undermined simply by 
the government's persistent challenge of its target settings . 11 
In response it may be argued that, were the government in a 
position to query, or criticize the Bank's choice of target, it would 
seriously undermine the latter's credibility , since it would lead people to 
wonder whether the Central Bank's independence might be abrogated by 
a future revision to the law. What one government enacts ,  another can 
repeal . Having, instead, the Government and Central Bank jointly set 
the target commits the former to the stated objective J and makes it harder 
for them to criticize the means whereby the Bank achieves the agreed 
end. So the joint nature of the target setting process may enhance its 
credibility. It is , however, arguable that, since an opposition party's 
task is to oppose,  it may be more likely to commit itself against 
continuation of a policy of price stability if the latter is represented by 
the Government's target than if it is the responsibility of the Bank alone 
to set it, but the point is debatable. Again some may question whether 
the government , if party to the agreement , might not set it too lax , on 
political time inconsistency grounds. On the other hand it would be 
difficult for a government publicly to raise the target inflation rate ; even 
the Canadian newly victorious Liberal Party , who had had their 
reservations about John Crow's policies, stuck to the same target rate 
when extending the period forward to 1998. Moreover, if the payment to 
senior Bank officials , or their reappointment , were to rest on achieving 
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their inflation target, they too could have an incentive to set numbers 
that were easily achievable, rather than too demanding. 
3 . 7  INCENTIVES AND STRUCTURE 
In any case, this discussion raises the question of what the 
incentive structure for the Governor, and/or the Board of the Central 
Bank should be. Under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act it is implied 
that failure to achieve the agreed target would result in the Governor not 
being reappointed. While this may have some considerable incentive 
effect, it will be less so if the Governor is anyhow reaching retirement 
age. Moreover, the incentive/ threat is not easily, or finely, calibrated; 
one would hardly dismiss for a miss of 0.1%, but then what extent of 
failure would justify refusal to reappoint; it would inevitably be both 
uncertain and arbitrary. Finally, this incentive is only applicable if final 
responsibility for Central Bank outcomes rests in the sole person of the 
Governor. While this concentration of responsibility on one person has 
the benefit of transparency, it does make that individual the focus for 
personal and political pressure. 
Such pressure can be much more easily deflected if responsibility 
for decisions lies with a larger Directorate, Committee, or Board. When 
the Banque de France was made independent (1993) responsibility for 
monetary policy making was transferred from the Governor to a Monetary 
Policy Council. On the other hand one can hardly sack a whole Board. 
One could, perhaps, have the votes and decisions of individual Board 
members publicly recorded, and then not reappoint those who had, ex 
post, been judged to have voted too often the "wrong" way. But that too 
would be an arbitrary and messy exercise .  
A simpler alternative would appear to be to set the payment for 
those responsible for policy, e. g. the Board members, dependent on their 
success in achieving the target. With the single focus on price stability, 
and its transformation into a numerical target, success, and failure, can 
now be readily calibrated, and (bonus) payments provided accordingly. 
This straight-forward idea has now been granted academic support in 
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several papers by Walsh (1993 and 1994a and b) and by Persson and 
Tabellini (1993 and 1994).  The last two authors state (1994, p. 1 1 )  that: 
"the optimal contract can be interpreted as a mandate to achieve 
price stability. The central bank is punished . . .  for any 
percentage point of inflation. Essentially, by punishing ex post 
the central bank for realized inflation, this contract adds a cost 
that the central bank has 'forgotten' : the cost of higher expected 
Inflation . . . .  the inflation bias [ of the Central Bankl ,  . . .  can be 
corrected simply by adding the correct marginal cost of inflation to 
the central bank's ex post social welfare function. " 
Indeed the authors castigate researchers in this field for not 
having seen this contractual approach before now. Thus, as the authors 
state: 
. "We find it remarkable that the contractual solution to the problem 
is so simple and that researchers, including ourselves, working in 
the field have failed to see it. " 
One of us, in 1989, when acting as an adviser to the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand had, indeed, advocated such a system of payment for the 
Governor, depending on results. For a time it was quite widely believed 
that such a bonus payment system had actually been adopted there, but 
it was in fact rejected during the preliminary discussions. The reason 
was primarily presentational. There was worry, especially at the 
Treasury, about the possibility of headlines representing that "Governor 
make $500 ,000 by ·throwing 500 , 000 out of work". Perhaps, once again, 
this is an issue that may be reconsidered when the transition to (almost) 
zero inflation has been achieved, so that the balance of policy need not be 
quite so deflationary as during the transition. 
An argument often given against Central Bankers being paid by 
their results is that the final outcome, and hence their payment, would be 
affected by various (short-term) shocks over which they have no control. 
Indeed so, but the impact of some supply shocks can be, and have been, 
expressly excluded from the contract, as has been already described. 
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More generally , businessmen and company profits are similarly buffeted 
by unforeseen .and uncontrollable shocks , and no-one suggests that this 
is a valid reason for dispensing with profit-related compensation for 
business leaders . Once there is a clear, calculable bottom line, 
remuneration can be related to its achievement. 
One possible concern, however, is that the inducement to hit the 
final numerical target is already so great , and the uncertainty of being 
able to achieve it so large , that the Central Bankers may try to get 
inflation down to the target level in advance of the terminal year, to give 
themselves the best chance of a relatively easy run in the final year. · 
Thus the incentives for Central Bankers may already be to shorten and 
tighten the transition period , possibly excessively so , once numerical 
targets are introduced, even without the bait of a bonus payment. 
Certainly , however, the structure and design of incentive arrangements 
for Central Bankers in this new context need some careful thought . 
3.8 ACCOUNTABILITY 
This leads on to the rather wider question of how an independent 
Central Bank can remain democratically accountable. Once again it is the 
focus on a primary single objective, price stability, especially if that is 
expressed in a quantified numerical target, wherein the target to be 
achieved, or at least the procedures involved, have the blessing of the 
government which enables accountability to be allied, as a complement 
rather than a contradiction, with 'independence' . In such a case choices 
between alternative objectives , which choices are inherently political , are 
minimised. Society, acting through its elected bodies , has specified quite 
closely what its agent, the Central Bank, is to aim to perform . All that 
remains is to report, usually to Parliament , how well the Bank has carried 
out this task . 
• Both Don Brash and John Crow brought inflation down rapidly to, 
or below J the rate specified in the agreement a year before that was 
required . 
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In truth the democratic accountability of an "independent" Central 
Bank mandated to the achievement of price stability as its over-riding 
objective is both far greater and much more transparent than that of a 
subservient Central Bank charged with trying to make trade-off 
compromises between a variety of objectives under the tutelage of a 
political master. It is odd that the issue of accountability has been raised 
as an argument against such Central Bank "independence" ,  whereas 
properly seen it is an argument in favour of such autonomy. The true , 
underlying issue is rather whether the single, overriding focus on price 
stability is , indeed, optimal. 
4. THE USE OF INTERMEDIATE TARGETS 
4 . 1  STRATEGIC ISSUES 
4 . 1 . 1  Introduction 
A subservient Central Bank does not need a target, at least on its 
own accord , since it will be carrying out the wishes of its political 
masters , who may, or may not, establish targets for themselves . An 
independent, and autonomous , Central Bank on the other hand has a 
greater need for some , preferably quantified, target objective, to provide 
both greater transparency and also a basis for accounting for its actions 
as agent . Once again, we emphasize the close linkage between having a 
single main focus for monetary policy, ie price stability , and the case for 
making the Bank into an independent agent. We shall, therefore, assume 
for these reasons that an independent Central Bank will want there to be 
established a publicly announced target for itself. 
Such a target can either be for a final, or for an intermediate 
objective. We have already noted that the final target now , almost 
universally , chosen by Central Banks is for price stability , and how, for 
those Banks directly targeting on this final objective, this has mapped 
into specific numerical targets for the inflation rate of the RPI/CPr. Only 
a few Banks now target final objectives directly , with only one so far , 
Sweden, in Continental Europe .  Instead the majority of other Central 
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Banks in our sample use intermediate targets, mostly pegging their 
exchange. rate within the ERM or prospectively so at some future date . 
In the remainder of this Section we shall first consider the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of having a publicly 
announced target for the final objective rather than for an intermediate 
variable . Of course ,  Central Banks targeting directly on inflation, via 
the RPI , or CPI , may also have subsidiary targets for intermediate 
variables ,  such as exchange rates (New Zealand is an example ) , which 
may, or may not , be announced, or otherwise publicly known . Equally , 
countries mainly targeting on intermediate variables , such as Germany or 
Switzerland, will adjust their response to the outcomes of those targets 
by their perceptions of the concurrent and future course of inflation 
itself. Nevertheless, it is usually clear enough which is the main target , 
and this is set out for the countries in our sample in Tables 2 and 3. 
Next we shall look at the relative advantages, and disadvantages , 
among the possible intermediate targets, of which exchange rates and 
monetary aggregates have been the main , but not the only, candidates. 
4.1.2 Final vs Intermediate Targets 
In so far as the final objective of almost all Central Banks is to 
achieve price stability , and this concept is capable of reasonable 
measurement , then the simplest and most obvious route would seem to be 
to target that directly . If this outcome is what we want Central Banks to 
achieve ,  then what should be done to set up a target system and an 
incentive structure that will maximise the chance of them doing so . 
Proponents of this approach would argue that concentrating, instead ,  on 
some intermediate variable - e .  g. the money stock - introduces 
complexity, since the links between monetary changes and price inflation 
are variable; and reduces transparency and understanding, since the 
relevance and significance of, somewhat arbitrary , monetary aggregates, 
for example, will be far less clear to the general public than the concept 
of inflation and price stability . Persson and Tabellini (1994, pp 14/15) 
express the same thought , in more formal and rigorous terms. Thus:  
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ttit is clear that the inflation contract is more direct and simpler to 
enforce [than an intermediate target] . . . .  Hence, a contract based 
on an intermediate monetary target is much more demanding on the 
principal1s information compared to an inflation contract . 
Generally the principal finds it easier to monitor the outcome rather 
than the policy instrument , because the optimal instrument choice 
depends on detailed information which may not be available to the 
principal . We are thus led to a general conclusion. An inflation 
contract . . .  minimizes the informational requirement of the 
principal and thus generally dominates contracts based on 
intermediate monetary targets or directly on the policy 
instrumentlt • 
Yet despite such arguments what we observe is relatively few , and 
mostly recent, direct inflation targets and a much larger number of 
Central Banks employing intermediate targets - as Persson and Tabellini 
recognize. One reason for this may have been historical accident, 
depending on the actual temporal evolution of ideas and operations in this 
field . Thus, the widespread consensus on focusing on the single 
objective of price stability is quite recent . The adoption of such a single 
intermediate target, for the exchange rate or for monetary aggregates , 
may have "Howed the Central Bank to work to a single target - and hence 
enhance its independence and autonomy - at an earlier date when the 
views of the general public , or of politicians , on the choice of final 
objectives made this latter a more contentious matter . 
A much more substantive argument in favour of intermediate 
targets, which Persson and Tabellini also note , is the much longer lags 
between policy action and inflation than between such action and effects 
in financial markets .  Thus they ask (ibid) :  
tlWhy do we see exchange rate targets or monetary targets often 
imposed (or self imposed) on central bankers, but rarely see 
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central bankers accountable for the rate of inflation? One reasons 
may have to do with the commitment technology available to the 
principal. The effect of policy actions on asset prices or the money 
supply is readily observable . [An assertion that we would dispute 
ourselves. ] The effect on prices is observable only with 
substantial delay. It may thus be harder for society to commit to 
'punishing' a central bank for actions undertaken six months or a 
year ago. [Again we regard this as an underestimate of the 
problem; the lag may be twice as long. ] If the central bank 
deviates from a financial target the penalty is more immediately 
related to the policy actions. It may therefore be easier to sustain 
such penalties than in the case of inflation targets. " 
Such long lags between action and inflation outcome undoubtedly 
complicate the working of a direct inflation target. The case for an 
intermediate target is that this could provide a much earlier signal 
whether policy is being appropriately applied, as Friedman has pointed 
out in earlier classic papers (and in Friedman, 1990) . 
Given these long lags in the effects of monetary policy on the final 
objective - i.e. price stability - and the uncertainties thereby involved, 
Central Banks are bound to pay attention to the development of key 
intermediate variables, such as monetary aggregates. But how much 
attention should be paid to each variable, and whether one, or more, 
should be elevated to the level of target, as contrasted with the rather 
more flexible concept of informational variable, will generally depend on 
They also propose a second reason. They suggest that the central 
bank may be risk averse, and therefore "clearly prefers a contract 
contingent on the money supply or some other easily [ sic! ] 
controllable nominal anchor, rather than an inflation target, which 
it will miss more frequently". We doubt the validity of this 
argument. First, the intermediate targets, either monetary 
aggregates or exchange rates, are not, and have not proved, 
easily controllable. Indeed, actual experience with hitting inflation 
targets, to date, has been much b.etter than with monetary targets; 
and the ERM has also had its difficulties. Second we doubt whether 
Central Bankers, as a group, have withdrawn from accepting 
appropriate targets just because of the problems of hitting them. 
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the perceived constancy and reliability of the relationships involved . 
Such perceptions have varied over time , and between countries. 
4.1 . 3 Interest Rate Targets 
This brings us to the next stage in the discussion. If an 
intermediate target is to be adopted, which might be best? We review 
three possibilities : an interest rate, an exchange rate , and (the best 
selection from a range of possible) monetary aggregate targets. 
The short-term interest rate has the advantage that it is the main 
policy instrument used by the Central Bank; changes in it are the result 
of policy decisions (primarily) and are instantaneously and accurately 
measured - in nominal terms.  But the problem is that the relevant 
measures , for affecting the economy, are real i,nterest rates and some 
interest differentials . These are either measured very uncertainly J 
because of the problem of observing heterogeneous expectations J or are 
subject , as in the case of interest differentials , to structural change and 
their effect either on financial flows or final expenditures is uncertain and 
time-varying. There is here again a general consensus that estimates of 
real interest rates and of certain key interest differentials ( e .  g.  the slope 
of the yield curve) should be important information variables for Central 
Bankers , but are not well suited to act as intermediate targets. 
4.1.4 Exchange Rate Targets 
The intermediate target variable that has been most commonly used 
in Europe has been the exchange rate . As shown in Table 3 ,  most 
European countries have made this their sole or main target at present. 
The comparative success of the ERM, at least until 1992/93, and the 
aspirations of other European countries outside the Community to become 
full members in due course, and in the meantime to peg their currencies 
to the ECU or the DM, have been responsible for the popUlarity of 
exchange rate intermediate targets . 
They have many virtues as such . Exchange rates are accurately 
and immediately measured; respond instantaneously to changes in interest 
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TABLE 3 
MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Present Intermediate Tan!'eI Comments and recent Cban2eS 
A. Exchange rate-ERM 
Belgillll'llLwtemboutg 
"""''''' Supplemented by domestic credit target in 1991 and 1992. 
""'''''' . 
N"""",," Supplemerued by domestic credit !aJtetS in 1990-1992. 
p"""", Between 1987-1992 broad money � set. The exchange rate 
became the only intermediate target bllO'Ning the entry of the escudo in lhe ERM in mid 1992. 
B. Exch� rate - ERM sul2I!:lemcnted � broad 
"""'" 
France (MJ) The exchange rate is the primary intennediate target since 1979 
when the ERM was created. 
Spain (ALP) The exchange rate is the primary intermediate tarp;et since 1989 
when the peseta entered iNo the ERM. Beforehand broad 
money was the monetary target since 1977. 
C. Broad money 
Germany (M3) Monetary ta1ge\.S set since 1974. The exchange rate is an 
important policy indicator. 
Italy (M2) The exchange rate ceased to be the primary intermediate � 
following the exit of the lira from the ERM in September I 2. 
G_ (MJ) The exchange rate is an imponant policy indicator. 
D. None 
United Kingdom (Inflation targeted directly) The exchange rate was the main intermediate target while the 
pound was in the ERM between October 1990 and September 
1992. At present, monetary aggregates and the exchange rate 
are only used as policy indicatots. 
Source: Centzal banks' reports 
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rates ; are widely understood by the public; and have a general and broad 
impact on the economy, depending on the degree of openness.  By 
pegging to the currency of another country / Central Bank with credibility 
in the pursuit of price stability, the international commitment involved 
can lead to a quicker and greater anti-inflationary credibility transfer 
than trying to establish a domestic reputation singlehandedly . Even 
where a country has determined to follow a domestic price/inflation target 
directly , it may still, as in the case of New Zealand, regard the exchange 
rate as such an important determinant , and signal, of future inflationary 
pressures that it will establish an (informal) operational target for the 
exchange rate : thus the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will vary interest 
rates up (or down) if a trigger-point (which they decide for themselves) 
is reached . Such trigger-points , one way or another, usually become 
known in markets . 
Some versions of such intermediate targets , notably Currency 
Board systems , as in Argentina (since 1991 ) ,  Estonia (since 1992) and 
Hong Kong (since 1983) , may have the added advantage of distancing the 
determination of monetary policy from domestic political control. Such 
Currency Boards may be viewed as a way of transferring monetary policy 
to an independent Central Bank, but in this case foreign rather than 
domestic . 
The disadvantage , of course ,  as was clearly evident in Europe in 
1992/93,  is that the monetary policy best suited to the leading, anchor 
country may not be appropriate, at any rate in the short run, to the 
countries pegging to it - e . g .  because of large real asymmetric shocks . 
The analysis of the problems of the ERM following German reunification is 
well known . Another example has been the need for Hong Kong to keep 
low US-level nominal interest rates , in order to maintain "the link" , at a 
time when its participation in the surging economy of Southern China has 
led to a booming economy and moderate inflation . 
Yet, as these examples also indicate , the advantages of an 
exchange rate link to a stable central economy are so considerable that , 
despite the manifold problems of 1992/93 for the ERM, most countries in 
Europe retain that as their main objective, and Hong Kong also remains 
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determined to keep the "link" with the US $ .  And , of course ,  the 
advantages of proceeding from stably linked currencies to monetary union 
within Europe are still seen as a prize to be achieved as soon as 
practicable . 
Whereas there are cirqumstances and conditions conducive to the 
use of the exchange rate as an intermediate target ( e . g .  for smaller, open 
countries ,  with poorer reputations for price stability) ,  and a desire for 
enhanced economic and political union with their neighbours, there will 
be other circumstances ( e . g .  larger , more closed economies ,  subject to 
asymmetric shocks, with no expectation or desire for greater union) 
where an exchange rate intermediate target would clearly be 
inappropriate . This leads us on to a brief consideration of the use of 
monetary targets, primarily within the European context. 
4 . 1 . 5 Monetary Targets 
In line with what happened in other parts of the world, since the 
mid-seventies a number of European countries have relied heavily on 
monetary aggregates to formulate their monetary policy. Monetary 
aggregates thus became the intermediate target of monetary policy. While 
the best-known and paradigmatic example in using monetary targets is 
Germany, other countries such as France, Italy , Spain and the United 
Kingdom (until 1987) established and publically announced annual ranges 
for the growth of a selected monetary aggregate--typically a broad 
aggregate6 • This practice of publically announcing monetary targets has 
continued up to the present in the first four countries , including the 
periods where their currencies have formed part of the ERM ( Germany 
and France : since 1979 ; Italy : from 1979 to September 1992; and Spain: 
since June 1989 ) .  
A common characteristic of these countries is that , by European 
standards , they are relatively large and not so open economies (see Table 
4 ) . In contrast ,  small open economies like Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
In addition to these countries, Greece has been setting monetary 
targets uninterruptedly since the mid-eighties . 
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TABLE .. 
(a) ECONOMIC SlZE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
(ill iIlcnuiag order, ill per«IIIt of total GDP of Europeaa U1lioD1) 
Luxembourg 0.1 
Ireland 0.7 
Greece 1.5 
Portugal 1.6 
Denmarlt 1.7 
Belgium 3.2 
Holand 4.7 
Spain 9.0 
United Kingdom \7.6 
Italy 18.1 
France 19.2 
Gennany 12:7 
Notes: 1. 1990 GDPs converted at PPP rates. 
2. Before unification, 
(b) DEGREE OF OPENNESS IN EUROPEAN COUNfRIES 
(ill dKRasiag Ot'der, ill pelUDt) 
ToW' lntra-� Uniorr 
Be1giumlLuxembourg 60 
""'''''' " 
Netherlands 49 
p"""", 34 
"'''''''''' 26 
Gennany 25 
G_ 21 
United Kingdom 20 
F""" 20 
IUly 16 
Spain 14 
Notes: 1 .  (Imports + Exponsl2yGDP in 1990. 
2. Intra-European Union exportS/GDP in 1990. 
Source: Eurostat 
- 37 -
50 
50 
40 
20 
14 
16 
12 
10 
13 
9 
7 
Netherlands and Denmark, have relied primarily on the exchange rate as 
the intermediate target of monetary policy, and while Portugal set 
monetary targets in the 1987-92 period it has recently shifted to setting 
exclusively exchange rate targets following the entry of the escudo in the 
ERM in mid-1992 . Table 3 summarises the monetary policy strategies 
presently adopted in the European Union. 
But why did Germany, France, Spain and Italy adopt monetary 
targets in the first place? 
I n  the mid-seventies, industrialised countries were going through 
a period of high inflation and inflationary expectations following the 
occurrence of supply-side shocks. At the same time as inflation worries 
mounted, shifting inflationary expectations made nominal interest rates 
less useful as policy guides and thus the attention of Central Banks 
turned to monetary aggregates. At the time, Central Banks found that 
monetary targets provided a considerably simpler and more transparent 
way of formulating monetary policy which could limit the room for 
discretion within the year; favourably influence the inflationary 
expectations of the public by providing a medium-term reference ; and 
permit the Central Bank a higher degree of "de facto" autonomy in 
pursuing the final goals of monetary policy. 
More precisely, when reading through the many Central Bank 
reports and speeches given by officials over the years to explain this 
strategic choice, one comes up with several reasons why some European 
Central Banks have been using monetary aggregates as intermediate 
targets (see also Bernanke and Mishkin, 1993). In particular, these rest 
on the belief that monetary aggregates: are linked in a rather stable and 
predictable manner to the medium-term evolution of nominal variables; can 
be controlled by Central Banks within reasonable limits; are helpful to 
convey information to the public about the medium-term orientation of 
monetary policy; since they are within the scope of monetary policy, they 
facilitate monitoring by the public; and allow a better division of 
responsibilities between the Central Bank and the government, and thus 
avoid external political pressures on monetary policy. 
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From the above description, it is clear that the reasons behind the 
choice of monetary targets square well with those given by the models of 
optimal monetary policy in the tradition of Poole (1970) . That is, monetary 
targets are suitable when the shocks affecting the economy come mainly 
from the demand for goods . In these cases , the evolution of monetary 
aggregates is more closely connected to that of the final variables , and by 
controlling money the deviations of final variables from their targeted 
values are minimised. Furthermore., it is only under these circumstances 
that the potentially favourable game-theoretic and expectational effects 
listed above from setting monetary targets are also obtained . In 
particular , as Englander ( 1990) suggests , when the monetary aggregate 
chosen is not linked in a stable and predictable way to the final variables 
-as a result of unforeseen velocity shocks- this has very unfavourable 
effects on the public's expectations . In particular, a strategy of refusing 
to accommodate velocity shocks in order to earn anti-inflationary 
credibility would result in misses regarding the final objective ;  and full 
accommodation would run the risk of undermining the usefulness of 
monetary targets in the first place as a device to influence the public's 
expectations . 
Over the years , and as economic integration progressed, many 
European Central Banks came to the view that ERM-membership could be 
an important way of fostering anti-inflationary credibility through the 
linking of their monetary policies to that of Germany, the country whose 
Central Bank enjoyed the best anti-inflationary reputation. As a result , 
in some European countries, generally these with smaller and more open 
economies , the exchange rate became the intermediate target for monetary 
policy. In larger, relatively less open economies ,  like France, Italy and 
Spain, while the institutional constraints associated to ERM membership 
clearly placed the exchange rate at the center stage of monetary policy, 
thus becoming the primary intermediate target, monetary authorities 
continued to set monetary targets . Therefore, it can be said that , in 
practice, the latter countries have set both exchange rate and monetary 
targets although , as will be discussed in the next section, with the 
increase in international capital mobility the exchange rate has become the 
central target of monetary policy. 
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4 . 2  OPERATIONAL ISSUES FOR TARGETRY 
4 . 2 . 1  The Operation of Direct Inflation Targets 
The main problem in successfully managing such a system arises 
from the combination of long lags in the effect of monetary policy with 
uncertainty both about future shocks and , more importantly , about the 
structure of the economic system itself, especially of the precise effects 
of changes in monetary policy instruments on the economy. Without such 
uncertainty , policy could be set now to deliver an expected future rate of 
inflation with some degree of confidence . Without the lags . policy could 
be varied, despite the uncertainty , until the designated inflation rate was 
achieved .  Given such lags , the attempt to use monetary policy a 
l'outrance to force a given change in inflation in the shorter run might 
prove impossible, and would cause instrument instability, whereby 
interest rates could become explosively unstable , as almost seemed at one 
time to be happening in the USA in 1979-81 . Many . perhaps the most 
severe , of the problems of operating monetary policy are caused by such 
lags , especially in the case of direct price inflation objectives . 
In these circumstances an enormous weight of responsibility rests 
on the shoulders of the chief economic forecaster in the Central Bank, 
charged with the duty of forecasting what inflation rate could be 
expected , on an unchanged policy assumption. This responsibility will 
be even more onerous if she is also asked to forecast what policy change 
now will be needed to drive future inflation into line with the target . The 
accuracy of those forecasts will be crucial to the success of the Bank in 
meeting its mandate . Moreover, the standard problems of inflation 
forecasting will be , almost certainly , exacerbated by the Lucas critique 
in this case. The wage/price decisions of agents will be affected ,  in ways 
that are difficult to predict in advance, by their perceptions of how the 
new regime may itself operate .  The role of chief economic forecaster in 
Central Banks adopting this regime is not enviable. 
Perhaps because of these problems there has been, both in Canada 
and New Zealand .  some apparent tendency for the Central Bank to press 
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ahead with getting inflation down to, or below, the target level, rather in 
advance of the agreed horizon. If the Bank of England was more 
autonomous, it might wish to do the same. Whereas the hypothesis about 
the inflation bias of the monetary authorities is well known from the time 
consistency literature, we would tentatively suggest that an independent 
Central Bank with an overriding priority to achieve a numerical target for 
inflation might have a transitional deflationary bias. 
4 . 2 . 2  The Operation of Exchange Rate Targets 
The main problem, of course, with such targets is that the nominal 
interest rates needed to maintain the exchange rate link may represent a 
real interest rate unsuited to the peripheral country - e.g. because of 
asymmetric shocks. Indeed, when this syndrome becomes particularly 
acute, as in the ERM in 1992/93, adjustments in nominal interest rates may 
even become ineffective in influencing capital flows and maintaining the 
exchange rate, because the resulting real interest rate is perceived by 
markets as domestically unsustainable. There were even occasions during 
this prolonged crisis when increases (decreases) in interest rates had a 
perverse effect in causing depreciation (appreciation) in the exchange 
rate for this reason. 
The normal response in such cases where one instrument, the 
interest rate, is asked to achieve two mutually inconsistent objectives is 
to try to find another instrument. One proposal, Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1993) , has been to revert to some version of exchange controls, 
to allow interest rates to be kept at levels more appropriate domestically. 
Another alternative is. to try to offset the deleterious domestic effects of 
inappropriate real interest rates by other measures and instruments. 
However, the attempt to find alternative instruments to ease the policy 
strains has not been markedly successful. The conceptual and practical 
shortcomings of any attempted re-imposition of exchange controls are 
well-known, and the attempt to offset inappropriate interest rate levels 
by an adjustment in fiscal policy (or by variations in direct credit 
controls) runs into other, again well-known problems. It is such 
difficulties that make many commentators skeptical that a pegged, but 
adjustable, exchange rate regime can represent a stable equilibrium in a 
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world of free capital movements in the absence of close policy 
coordination. Such considerations are influencing views and attitudes 
towards both the speed of achieving, and the optimal transition path 
towards , EMU . 
4 . 2 . 3  The Operation of Monetary Targets 
In practice, the main operational issues surrounding the 
implementation of monetary targets concern the choice of monetary 
aggregate; the reference period over which it is set; the speed with which 
deviations from target are corrected - if at all-during the year ; and 
whether base drift should be allowed. In order to guide their decisions 
concerning the above issues , Central Banks normally make use of the 
information contained in other monetary J financial and economic variables . 
This tends to blur, in practice, the difference between the "one-step" 
and "two-step" approaches to monetary policy . In particular , by letting 
the growth of monetary aggregates differ from mld-point target ranges in 
response to well-identified disturbances ,  Central Banks can hope to 
conduct policy with few informational inefficiencies , and nevertheless still 
benefit from favourable expectational effects , but, to be successful, this 
depends greatly on their prior reputation and credibility. 
Important operational issues arise also when trying to influence the 
course of monetary growth in the desired direction . For instance , the 
remuneration at market rates of certain components of the targeted 
monetary aggregate may make it difficult to reduce monetary growth , say, 
by increasing official interest rates , and may, at times , actually have the 
opposite effect. In addition, when there is close international financial 
market integration, ERM countries trying to reduce monetary growth 
through contractionary liquidity operations may easily see their attempts 
frustrated by inward capital flows . 
The economic effects of adopting monetary targets may thus depend 
significantly on how, in practice , they have been implemented. In order 
to assess how flexible has been the conduct of monetary targets in 
Europe ,  Table 5 contains information on the targeted and actual money 
growth rates of Germany , France, Italy and Spain. As it is clear from the 
- 42-
T
A
BL
E 
5:
 T
A
R
G
E
TED
 A
ND
 A
crv
A
L
 M
O
N
EY
 G
R
O
WT
H
 
G
ERMANV
 
FRAN
C
E
 
y
,,
, 
V
ari
ab
le
 
T 
" 
O
ut
co
m
e 
Co
m
m
ents
 
y
",
 
V
ari
ab
le 
T
 
" 
O
ut
co
m
e 
eonun.ru
. 
19
75
 
C"*F'"
",,-
• 
10
 
M
. 
19
77
 
M
2 
12
.5
 
13
.9
 
H 
19
76
 
• 
'.
2 
If
 
19
78
 
12
 
12
>
 
H 
19
77
 
• 
• 
H 
'.19
 
11
 
14
.4
 
M
. 
19
78
 
• 
11
.5
 
M
> 
I.
"
 
11
 
•••
 
If 
,.19
 
6-.
 
.,)
 
" 
19
81
 
12
 (rev
) 
11
.4
 
H 
19
80
 
5-
' 
'.
0 
If
 
19
82
 
12
 . .5
-1
3.
5 
II
.S
 
M
· 
19
81
 
4-
1 
3.
' 
M
· 
,.
83
 
9 
(rev
) 
10
.2
 
H 
19
82
 
4-
1 
'.
1 
11
 
"84
 
, 
5.
5-
6.
5 
7.
' 
M
+ 
19
83
 
4-
1 
•••
 
" 
19
85
 
M
2R
 
4-'
 
•••
 
M
' 
19
84
 
4-
. 
4.
' 
" 
19
86
 
M
3 
3·
' 
4.
' 
H
 
19
85
 
3.
5-
4.
5 
4.
5 
" 
19
87
 
M
2(
new
) 
3·
, 
'.
2 
M
> 
19
86
 
3.
5-
5.
5 
7.
' 
M
. 
19
88
 
I 
4-6
 
4.
0 
H 
19
81
 
, 
3·
, 
• 
M
 • 
19
89
 
4-
, 
4.
3 
11 
19
88
 
M
3 
3-
6 
'.
1 
M
> 
199
0 
, 
3.
.5-
5.
5 
-n
.5 
. 
M
· 
19
89
 
, 
4.
1 
" 
199
1 
M
3(
new
) 
5-
1 
3 .
' 
M
· 
199
0 
4-6
 
, .
. 
11 
1992
 
I 
4·
' 
• 
H
 
19
91
 
3-
5 
(rev
) 
'.
2 
M
' 
19
93
 
4-
6.
5 
-0
.9
 
M
· 
199
2 
3.
5-
5.
5 
• .4
 
M
. 
199
4 
, 
, 
199
3 
4.
5-
6.
5 
1.
' 
M
. 
199
4 
4-6
 
, t;
 
IT
A
LY
 
SP
A
IN
 
19
75
 
Domesti
c C
redi
t 
13
.9
 
12
.5
 
11 
19
78
 
M
3 
14
.5
-1
9.
5 
20
.3 
M
. 
19
76
 
16
.7
 
18
.8
 
M
' 
19
19
 
I 
15
 . .5
-1
9.
5 
19
.4
 
H'
 
19
77
 
" 
17
.8
 
M
> 
19
80
 
16
-2
0 
16
.1 
H 
19
78
 
19
.5
 
20
.8 
" 
19
81
 
14
.5
·1
8.
5 
15
.7
 
H 
1919
 
18
.6
 
18
.7
 
11 
19
82
 
13
.5
·1
7.
5 
15
.3
 
11 
19
80
 
17
.7
 
18
.5
 
11 
19
83
 
, 
II
-I
S 
12
.8
 
H 
19
81
 
16
.1 
18
.1 
M
' 
19
84
 
AL
P 
11
.5
 
14
.5
 
H 
19
82
 
15
.5
 
20
.' 
M
' 
19
85
 
11
.5
-1
4.
5 
14
3
 
H 
19
83
 
18
.0
 
20
.7
 
M
' 
19
86
 
9.
5-
12
.5
 
12
.4
 
11
 
19
84
 
15
.9
 
19
.7
 
M
+ 
19
87
 
6.
5-
9.
5 
13
.1 
M>
 
19
85
 
, 
16
.1 
18
.1 
M
. 
19
88
 
8·
11
 
13
.4
 
M
' 
19
86
 
M
2 
7-
11
 
•••
 
H 
19
89
 
6.
5·
9.
5 
12
.8
 
M>
 
19
87
 
6-.
 
• ••
 
H 
199
0 
6.
5-
9.
5 
11
.4
 
M
' 
19
88
 
6-'
 
•••
 
11
 
199
1 
7·
11
 
10
.9
 
H 
1989
 
6-
. 
11
.3
 
M
' 
199
2 
8·
11
 
'.
2 
M
· 
199
0 
6-.
 
• ••
 
M
' 
199
3 
45
·7
.5
 
•••
 
M
' 
19
91
 
5-
. 
'.
0 
M
' 
199
4 
3·
7 
19
92
 
5-
1 
, ..
 
H 
199
3 
5-
7 
7.
' 
M
' 
199
4 
5-
7 
N_
: 11
1M: ..
..... hi
tlmi
..t.
 Wbca.
 oin&!
e-V
III
Ie Iarp
p, it 
it
..
........:l ID
 imc>l
ici
t .
... p
 of
t 
L.S
%.
 
+/.
: rn<>I
IfIWy�
 �
 \arid
 
�
�
:,",�
'kori .;!:
: )'I
II' 
Table , there have been elements of short-run flexibility in the 
management of monetary targets : targets have generally been expressed 
as ranges rather than as a single-value; in many occasions the recorded 
monetary growth has been within the range but not close to the mid-point; 
at times targets have been undershot or overshot ; there has been 
significant base drift ; and the specific monetary aggregate playing the 
role of intermediate target has changed overtime as financial innovation 
as evolved. 
While monetary aggregates have played ,  all in all, a useful role in 
the pursuit of anti-inflationary monetary policies in the above countries 
during many years , their interpretation has become increasingly more 
complex as a result of the ongoing processes of financial innovation and 
deregulation, and their controllability more precarious in an environment 
of exchange rate stability and free capital mobility . 
As regards financial innovation , the new cash-management 
techniques used by firms adapting to the possibilities made available by 
an increasingly sophisticated and deregulated financial environment , and 
the shift of household financial holdings towards remunerated liquid 
assets have provoked important changes in the sectoral composition of 
monetary holdings . This has led to an increasing difficulty in 
interpreting the evolution of monetary aggregates, as testified by the 
reduced stability of demand for money functions (see Fase, 1993 ) .  
Finally, in Europe the process of financial innovation has been accelerated 
most recently through the introduction of financial legislation associated 
with the establishment of the Single Internal Market in 1993. In 
particular, banks from Member States have been allowed to do business 
without restrictions throughout the European Union . 
The other major development affecting the implementation of 
monetary targets in European countries has to do with the constraints 
imposed by the ERM. As mentioned earlier on, Germany has traditionally 
played the anchor role in the System; that is , the Bundesbank has freely 
set German monetary policy) and the other countries have adapted their 
domestic monetary conditions so as to maintain exchange rate stability . 
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But how much monetary autonomy has been left to those non-anchor 
countries like France, Italy or Spain which set monetary targets? 
It is well-known that when a country adopts a fixed exchange rate 
the money supply becomes fully endogenous when the following conditions 
are simultaneously satisfied: the country does not exert a significant 
influence on the level of international interest rates; there is perfect 
international capital mobility; and there is perfect substitutability 
between domestic and foreign bonds. In these circumstances, the domestic 
monetary authorities can only influence the breakdown of monetary 
growth between its domestic and external sources but lose control of the 
total . In this case, while the rate of monetary growth can be set !tex ante!t 
so as to be compatible with the maintenance of exchange rate stability, the 
presence of shocks will, in general , make actual money growth differ !tex 
post" from the targeted value if exchange rate stability is indeed 
preserved . 
It is clear from the above that, other things equal, setting 
monetary targets outside Germany would only make sense if some of the 
previous conditions do not hold . In particular, the room for domestic 
monetary autonomy on the part of the non-anchor countries will tend to 
be larger : when there is a band within which exchange rates can move; 
when central parities can be adjusted; when capital mobility is not 
perfect; and when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes.  
From its creation in 1979 until 1987 the ERM experienced frequent 
realignments which, coupled with the presence of exchange controls in 
the countries with relatively weak currencies - France and Italy - gave 
some room for manoeuvre to their respective monetary authorities as 
regards monetary control. In contrast, in the period from 1987 to 
September 1992, the ERM did not experience any general realignment and 
capital controls were eliminated in most member countries with a view to 
the establishment of the Single Internal Market . This made it increasingly 
difficult for non-anchor countries to meet monetary targets while 
preserving exchange rate stability . Subsequently, the crisis experienced 
by the ERM from September 1992 to July 1993 led to the exit of the British 
pound and the Italian lira from the mechanism ;  to the devaluation of the 
- 45-
peseta, the escudo and the Irish pound; and to the widening of the 
bilateral fluctuation bands to ± 15% after August 2nd, 1993. 
As a result of the widening of the bands the participating countries 
have currently regained some margin o,f manoeuvre for adapting monetary 
developments to domestic conditions . In other words , while the exchange 
rate remains the fundamental variable as far as monetary policy is 
concerned, at least for most of the remaining ERM countries, the recent 
changes in the ERM may have allowed the monetary authorities of 
countries setting monetary targets room to improve their control over 
their national moneys. 
All in all, however, even if at present it can be claimed that Central 
Banks have a better control over monetary targets than a couple of years 
ago, the ongoing process of financial innovation continues to pose serious 
problems regarding the effectiveness of such strategy. It is for this 
reason that we consider that those European Central B anks which have a 
long-tradition in setting monetary targets are becoming, with the passage 
of time, more pragmatic in the implementation of their monetary strategies 
given the prevalence of the exchange rate target. Even in Germany, 
where the only target is the growth of M3, monetary growth has recently 
been allowed to be well in excess of the target range. The structural 
changes derived from unification; the processes of financial innovation 
and deregulation; and the foreign exchange interventions of the 
Bundesbank on 1?ehalf of other currencies during the ERM crisis , are all 
factors which, at least partly J account for the excessive monetary growth 
recorded in Germany in past years and also at present. I n  spite of this, 
the Bundesbank has continued to pursue a cautious policy of interest rate 
reductions in the light of the diminishing inflationary pressures observed 
in the German economy, which suggests that monetary targets are being 
implemented in a pragmatic manner. 
5 .  THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMU FOR MONETARY STRATEGY 
AND TACTICS IN EUROPE 
The Treaty on European Union, enacted on November 1st 1993, 
contemplates the creation of a Monetary Union in Europe within the 
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present decade . According to the Treaty, the European System of Central 
Banks ( ESCB) will formulate and implement the single monetary policy in 
the Union. However} the Treaty does not allow for any gradual transfer 
of monetary sovereignty from national authorities towards the central 
institutions before the establishment of the Monetary Union. This means 
that there will be a sort of "Big Bang" on the very day when the Union is 
created, with a sudden shift from the coexistence of national monetary 
policies, formulated in the pursuit of national objectives and implemented 
through different procedures ,  to a single monetary policy, set by a 
supranational institution with Union-wide objectives and operated in a 
consistent way throughout the area. 
While the future creation of the Monetary Union represents a shock 
of unprecedented magnitude, the anticipation of that gives time to 
prepare the regulatory and logistical framework which is necessary for 
the ESCB effectively to carry out the single monetary policy from the very 
first day. This preparatory work is one of the major tasks of the 
European Monetary Institute, an institution born in January 1st, 1994 as 
precursor of the future European Central Bank . .  
In this section, we start by describing the present nature of 
monetary ·operations in European countries ,  then proceed to examine 
briefly the objectives and nature of the ESCB , and conclude with a 
discussion of the main operational reforms and adjustments needed to 
prepare the future single monetary policy . 
5 . 1  HOW DIFFERENT- AT PRESENT IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
MONETARY POLICY IN THE VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES? 
In previous sections of this paper we have already discussed a 
number of key issues concerning the final objective of monetary policy 
and the various strategies available for achieving these objectives. With 
regard to European countries, the information contained in Table 1 
suggests that while price stability constitutes "de facto" the final 
objective of monetary policy in most countries, national Central Banks 
(NCBs)  vary quite considerably as regards their degree of formal and 
effective autonomy . In addition , Table 3 indicates than there are also 
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important differences in the monetary policy strategies followed in the 
various Eurqpean countries to pursue the final objectives . 
What we have not tackled yet are the more technical and operational 
issues concerning the execution of monetary policy in the various 
countries. 7 Recently methods of executing monetary policy in European 
countries have converged in two main respects . First, open market 
operations have been increasingly used to regulate liquidity conditions J 
which has made them the main monetary instrument in most countries .  And 
second, money market interest rates have become established as the main 
operational target in the daily conduct of monetary policy . 
In spite of this J there are still significant differences across 
countries concerning the use of other monetary policy instruments and 
procedures . Table 6 summarises the respective national roles played by 
reserve requirements , standing facilities and open market operations . 
Reserve reguirements are used to a very different extent in the 
various countries in the process of regulating liquidity conditions. 
Indeed , in spite of the trend towards lowering reserve requirements 
which has taken place in recent years in the European Union as a result 
of the desire to improve competition and efficiency in the banking 
industry, as can be seen in part A of the Table there are still important 
national differences regarding the level and remuneration of reserve 
requirements . For example, while such requirements are not used for 
monetary policy purposes at present in countries like Belgium, Denmark , 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, they are still used in the other 
countries ,  and in particular in Portugal and Italy . In the latter countries , 
the monetary authorities have traditionally employed reserve requirements 
to induce or enlarge the demand for bank reserves and, when coupled 
with averaging provisions, to allow the banking system to cope better 
Consult the 1993 Annual Report of the Committee of Governors of 
European Central Banks for a clear description of national monetary 
policy instruments and procedures in the European Union. See also 
Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni (1992) . 
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with situations of excess or insufficient liquidity, thus reducing the need 
for direct Central Bank intervention in the market. 
Standing facilities offered by Central Banks to financial institutions 
on a bilateral basis (ie. discount window, other direct credit and deposit 
lines) constitute another instrument at the disposal of Central Banks to 
regulate liquidity conditions . As seen in part B of the Table , while these 
facilities play little or no role in the majority of European countries, they 
�are quite important in Italy and Germany , and most important in the 
Netherlands where they account for a significant part of the supply of 
liquidity . 
In spite of the increasingly important role of open market 
operations in regulating liquidity conditions in all countries , it is only in 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal that they are presently the 
main instrument. In addition, as shown in part C of the Table , there are 
significant differences in the ways in which these operations are 
conducted in the various European countries ( e .  g. types of assets used, 
frequency of operations , and procedures to auction liquidity) . 
Finally , although not specifically part of monetary policy 
operations, it is important to mention that until recently a number of 
national Central Banks in Europe have been financing the public sector . 
However, with the enactment of the Treaty on European Union, Central 
Banks have been prohibited since January 1st, 1994 from giving 
overdrafts or other type of credit facilities to the public sector, and from 
purchasing public debt directly in the primary market. The purchasing 
of public debt in the secondary market is also forbidden for purposes 
other than regulating monetary conditions. As suggested by the various 
initial national situations , the impact of these recent legislative changes 
are likely to be felt rather differently across Europe . 
5 . 2  THE ESCB : OBJECTIVES AND AUTONOMY 
The Treaty of Maastricht sets price stability as the primary 
objective of the European System of Central Banks and establishes that 
the general economic policies in the European Union shall be supported 
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only a,s long as this does not conflict with price stability. While the aim is 
to avoid the potential conflicts which arise when all the objectives are at 
par, there is no specific definition in the Statute of what constitutes 
" price stability" nor of the criteria to assess when price stability enters 
into "conflict" with other policies .  I n  practice, however, many Central 
Bankers would regard a rate of inflation between 0 and 2 or 3% as 
consistent with price stability. 
In addition to a clear mandate to fight inflation, the future ESCB is 
equipped with a significant degree of institutional and functional 
autonomy .  As concerns institutional autonomy, the Statute tries to ensure 
that governments will not interfere in the monetary decision-making 
process . The following statutory provisions are related to this goal: 
prohibition of seeking or receiving instructions from government bodies ;  
the requirement that the statutes o f  the member Central Banks guarantee 
their respective institutional and functional autonomy; assured tenure for 
the members of the governing bodies of the ESCB; and strict conditions 
on amending the Statute in any fundamental way. As concerns functional 
autonomy, the Statute gives the ESCB full powers to use monetary policy 
instruments subject to the constraint that they be compatible with market 
principles . 
As indicated by the comparative analysis of Alesina and Grilli 
(1992) the ESCB will enjoy a very high degree of formal autonomy in 
monetary policy-making. Nevertheless, since the Treaty places decisions 
on exchange rate policy outside the ESCB, the effective autonomy of the 
new institution might be compromised, as the monetary stance required 
to maintain price stability may conflict with exchange rate objectives . To 
minimise this risk the T reaty states that exchange rate decisions will be 
taken only after consulting the ESCB in an attempt to reach a consensus 
consistent with the objective of price stability. 
5 . 3  THE SINGLE MONETARY POLICY 
T he Treaty establishes that by the end of 1996 at the latest, the 
European Monetary Institute (EM!) should have undertaken all the 
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necessary preparations needed for the ESCB effectively to carry out the 
single monetary policy. 
The scale and complexity of the task facing the EM! can be readily 
assessed from the following two considerations . On the one hand , the 
absence of any transfer of monetary power to the EMI makes it impossible 
to exercise ,  even in a small scale, the running of the future single 
monetary policy before the establishment of Monetary Union. Contrary to 
the spirit of some of the proposals made during the preparation of the 
Delors Report, the EMI does not have any authority or instruments to 
influence the stance of European monetary policy -a task which is left for 
the ESCB . On the other hand, while the Statute defines the broad 
principles which should guide the formulation and execution of the single 
monetary policy, there are many strategic and tactical issues which are 
left fully open in the Statute and which have yet to be addressed. 
On the strategic side, an adequate framework must be developed 
for formulating monetary policy. This involves considering whether 
intermediate targets in general, and monetary targets in particular , might 
be useful in the conduct of the future monetary policy of the ESC B ,  as 
well as exploring which variable could best play this role . On the tactical 
side , the necessary infrastructure must be put in place to enable the 
proper execution of a single monetary policy. This means identifying the 
minimal requirements for guarantying the uniformity of monetary 
conditions throughout the Union, and exploring how to execute the single 
monetary policy with the optimal degree of decentralisation. 
In what follows , we discuss in some greater detail the above issues , 
partly drawing on Monticelli and Vinals (1993) and Vinals (1994 ) . 
5 . 3 . 1  Strategic aspects : policy formulation 
As concerns the strategic aspects of formulating a single monetary 
policy, it is likely that European Central Banks will settle for a framework 
which exhibits considerable simplicity and transparency , and which 
enhances the anti-inflationary credibility of the ESCB . Although it is too 
early to tell which specific framework will be adopted, we think that it is 
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reasonable to assume that intermediate targets may be assigned an 
important role in the conduct of monetary policy on the basis of the 
reasons discussed in Section 4 .  This impression is reinforced by the fact 
that some of the most successful and important Central Banks in the 
European Union rely at present on intermediate monetary targets . Thus, 
the adoption of a similar monetary policy strategy by the ESCB would 
allow a certain degree of continuity with present practices and , possibly, 
also the transfer of certain degree of anti-inflationary credibility to the 
ESCB . Nevertheless the recent surge in M3 in Germany , at a time of 
declining growth in nominal incomes there, has led to some greater doubts 
about the value of intermediate monetary targeting . 
On the other hand, in so far as the European Union follows a 
floating exchange rate policy vis-a.-vis third currencies, the 
controllability of the money supply at the area level could be higher than 
it is at present at the national level for some countries as a result of the 
constraints imposed by the ERM. Finally, the empirical evidence provided 
by Kremers and Lane (1990) , Artis (1991 ) ,  Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn 
(1991 ) ,  and Cassard et a1. (1994) suggests that a stable demand for 
money may exist for the European Union as a whole . 
However, even if it was decided in principle to adopt monetary 
targets, there could still be severe problems in selecting the monetary or 
financial aggregate most suited to this role . The reason is simple : the 
passage to Monetary Union constitutes by itself an unprecedent structural 
regime change 'with major consequences which may alter in unknown ways 
the underlying relationships between the evolution of economic and 
financial variables and that of final variables . For this reason, there is a 
lot to be said in favour of a pragmatic policy strategy in the first years 
after the creation of EMU . In particular , the ESCB might do best to rely 
on a number of selected economic and financial indicators, no doubt 
incluging monetary and financial aggregates, in order to achieve its price 
stability objective during the first few years of Monetary Union. Only 
after things had settled down might it be possible to assess whether 
monetary targets were the best way of formulating the single monetary 
policy . 
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5 . 3 . 2  Tactical aspects: policy execution 
While it is not possible to predict with any grea.t degree of accura.cy 
what will be the full effect of the recent creation of the Single Internal 
Market on the future shape of the economic and financial framework of the 
European Union, there are two questions which nevertheless must now be 
addressed regarding preparations for future monetary policy in Stage 
Three.  First , what are the minimum requirements needed for the conduct 
of a single monetary policy? And second, what instruments can be used 
to execute monetary policy in a more or less decentralised setting? 
These questions implicitly assume that monetary policy instruments 
and procedures will still differ across member countries when EMU is 
established , and that a non-negligible degree of decentralisation will 
characterise the execution of the European monetary policy, at least in 
the early years . The first assumption is justified because differences in 
national policy instruments and procedures tend to be persistent, and are 
unlikely to disappear in the next few years despite the market forces 
towards greater competition unleashed by the Single Internal Market. 
Moreover) Central Banks feel comfortable with their own way of executing 
monetary policy, and can thus be expected to maintain their customary 
practices) which reflect specific market and institutional features .  The 
second assumption rests on the fact that it is probably more efficient to 
execute monetary policy in a non-fully centralised way so as to make use 
of the considerable human capital accumulated by Central Banks in terms 
of knowledge of national financial institutions . It also recognises that the 
Treaty states that tlto the extent deemed possible and appropriate ( . . .  
» )  the European Central Bank shall have recourse to the national central 
banks to carry out operations" (Article 12 . 1 ) .  Personally, we would 
expect these arguments to lose force with the passage of time) thus 
working towards greater centralisation ultimately in the execution of 
monetary policy . 
What are the minimal requirements for the conduct of a single 
monetary policy? 
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Money market integration 
The most important one is to achieve the integration of national 
interbank markets so as to ensure that interest rate arbitrage brings 
about a single monetary stance throughout the Union, regardless of where 
the injection or subtraction of liquidity is made . For arbitrage to ensure 
the equalisation of interbank interest rates, credit institutions must be 
able to transfer their interbank positions across borders . This, however, 
does not require the centralisation of payment and settlement systems at 
the Union level. Instead} all that is required is that national payment 
systems are adequately linked to ensure that interbank funds can be 
transferred across borders and, once transferred ,  can be used for final 
settlements within the same day. 
While these measures are sufficient to create an integrated 
interbank market, and thus permit the conduct of a single monetary 
policy, unfortunately they do not ensure the safety of the interbank 
payment and settlement system. This requires specific measures to reduce 
risks , notably liquidity , credit and systemic risks, as well as common 
legal provisions regulating the finality of payments and the revocability 
of payment instructions . 
Harmonisation 
Is the harmonisation of monetary policy instruments and procedures 
necessary for the achievement of a single monetary stance through the 
Union? At a macroeconomic level this is not really required since , in 
theory, for any set of instruments it is always possible for the ESCB to 
hit its intermediate or final target through appropiate movements of the 
instruments . Nevertheless, there are two microeconomic reasons which 
suggest that achieving a certain degree of harmonisation among national 
instruments and procedures might be very desirable when EMU is set-up . 
The first reason relates to the concern that regulatory arbitrage on 
the part of financial institutions could lead to major shifts in the location 
of financial activity within the Union , if differences in monetary policy 
instruments and procedures implied differences in the cost-subsidy mix 
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involved in banking with the various members of the ESCB . The case of 
reserve requirements is the most obvious example. The conduct of a 
single monetary policy could be perfectly compatible with different 
reserve requirement provisions within the ESCB (the "European" money 
multiplier would be given by a weighted average of "national" 
multipliers ) ,  as interest rate arbitrage would in any case lead to a single 
monetary stance throughout the Community . However , not all financial 
institutions would be on the same competitive footing, at least initially , 
and the ones penalised by regulation would tend to circumvent it, moving 
their activities to more favourable locations . This line of argument 
supports the harmonisation of reserve requirements (not excluding the 
zero option) and of the conditions on the standing facilities offered on a 
bilateral basis to financial institutions. Otherwise, the result would be 
regulatory arbitrage , which would entail inefficiencies and could lead to 
a perverse competition between NCB s .  Furthermore , shifts in the location 
of financial activity could complicate the conduct of monetary policy , as 
they would increase the noise associated with monetary and financial 
developments . The signal extraction problem faced by the ESCB would be 
exacerbated in a situation which will in any case be difficult as a result of 
the regime change involved by the start of EMU . 
The second reason motivating a certain degree of harmonisation in 
instruments and procedures is that it would facilitate the understanding 
of policy signals on the part of the market participants . Particular 
conventions (not always corresponding to the use of a specific set of 
instruments) have been established to clarify whether Central Bank 
operations are meant to maintain the prevailing policy stance in the face 
of shocks, or whether a change in policy orientation is intended. The 
coexistence of several conventions would prove confusing. Appropriate 
actions on the part of the ESCB together with market trading and 
arbitrage would eventually bring about the desired liquidity stance , but 
this process could give rise to misunderstandings , undesired volatility in 
interest rates and other inefficiencies in the management of liquidity 
conditions . Once again , while this argument also suggests that 
harmonisation would be desirable, it does not help to determine its 
specific terms . 
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These arguments suggest that a close harmonisation of monetary 
policy instruments and procedures would be desirable in order to allow 
the ESCB to signal its policy intentions efficiently. and would be 
necessary to avoid major shifts in the location of financial activities. 
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning only points to the benefits of 
harmonisation in its own merit and leaves the terms of harmonisation 
indeterminate. 
Instruments and decentralisation 
There are two final key issues which need to be tackled in 
preparing the technical infrastructure for future monetary policy: the 
choice of instruments (reserve requirements , standing facilities and open 
market operations) , and the degree to which policy execution can be 
delegated to national Central Banks . 
Regarding the choice of instruments , as mentioned earlier, over the 
past years open market operations have generally become the main 
channel through which monetary conditions are influenced in European 
countries ,  and money market interest rates the principal operational 
target in the daily conduct of national monetary policies .  Nevertheless , 
there are still significant differences in the use made by countries of two 
other channels for re�lating liquidity conditions : reserve requirements 
and standing facilities . Thus , an important question is what should be the 
importance of these two instruments vis-a.-vis open market operations in 
the execution of the single monetary policy. 
The Statute of the ESCB contemplates the use of reserve 
reguirements in EMU since it states that "the ECB may require credit 
institutions established in Member States to hold minimum reserves on 
accounts with the ECB and national central banks in pursuance of 
monetary policy objectives" (Article 1 9 . 1 )  . 
As is well-known, reserve requirements are not necessary to 
control the evolution of monetary variables in EMU J since this can be 
achieved through open market operations . Furthermore. when not fully 
remunerated ,  reserve requirements may encourage socially sub-optimal 
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financial behaviour, since they constitute a distortionary tax on banking 
activities which drives a wedge between deposit and lending rates . Where 
reserve requirements could be useful is in facilitating the management of 
the money market (see Hardy, 1993) . In particular, when instrumented 
with averaging provisions, reserve requirements allow the banking 
system to tlcope with temporary liquidity shortages or surpluses in the 
market without central bank interventiontl ( Committee of Governors, 
1993 ) . This is found presently useful by many Central Banks because it 
gives them the freedom to choose how frequently they should be in the 
market to steer money market interest rates in the appropriate direction . 
In principle, reserve requirements could be set in EMU sO that they 
facilitate money market management without creating excessive distortions 
on financial behaviour. Specifically, a uniform zero average reserve 
requirement in the Union would accomplish these goals provided banks 
find it costly not to meet the requirement and provided there is a large 
enough overdraft facility at the Central Bank . 
Another potential instrument at the disposal of the ESCB to 
regulate liquidity conditions are standing facilities .  These are offered on 
a bilateral basis by the Central Bank to specific financial institutions to 
cushion their liquidity shortages or surpluses . In general , these facilities 
play a similar role to that of reserve requirements ; that is, to stabilise 
money market conditions and to lower short-term interest rate volatility . 
Thus, in this r.egard, their usefulness is to some extent contingent on the 
specific arrangements made regarding reserve requirements . In addition 
to the above, the pre-announced rates at which standing facilities are 
offered can be used -as is the case now in several European countries- to 
signal changes in the policy intentions of the monetary authorities . It is 
not obvious to us , however , why this latter function cannot be exercised 
instead through open market operations . 
Open market operations are the third instrument available to the 
ESCB to execute the single monetary policy. While a number of important 
decisions will have to be made regarding the nature and frequency of 
operation , the eligible underlying assets , the number of counterparties , 
and the auction procedures , there are well-known efficiency reasons in 
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favour of open market operations playing a central role in the execution 
of a single monetary policy . 
Having briefly described the main available instruments,  we now 
turn to discussing the potential role of open market operations vis-a-vis 
those of reserve requirements and standing facilities in the execution of 
future monetary policy . 
In practice, the choice of instruments should be made on grounds 
of economic and operational efficiency and, once a specific decision has 
been taken , the selected instruments should be varied over time to 
achieve the desired objectives. In the case of EMU , however, the 
diversity of initial conditions as regards national monetary instruments 
and procedures and the provisions in the Statute are likely to imply that 
the centrally-decided single monetary policy will be executed in a rather 
decentralised way, at least in the early years . 
If, as seems likely , the issue of decentralisation plays an important 
role in deciding how to execute future monetary policy, this could be 
crucial in determining the relative importance of the various instruments . 
The reason is that the management of both reserve requirements and 
standing facilities can be decentralised to a much greater extent than 
open market operations . On the one hand, provided reserve 
requirements are the same throughout the Union, there are no difficulties 
in delegating the management of this instrument to national Central 
Banks . In turn, since reserve requirements permit a lower frequency of 
intervention of Central Banks in the money market, this makes it easier 
to decentralise the execution of the single monetary policy. 
Similarly, the decentralisation of standing facilities has some 
operational advantages , and would not seem difficult to reconcile with an 
overall control of central bank money injected or withdrawn through this 
channel . The ECB would be relieved from the burden of maintaining 
accounts with all banks operating in the Union, while the human capital 
of knowledge on specific credit institutions that NCBs have accumulated 
over the years would be better exploited .  
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In contrast to the abov-e, the decentralised execution of open 
market operations is much more difficult to contemplate in practice. 
Indeed , as with foreign exchange operations , open market operations 
must be executed in a timely and flexible fashion to offset liquidity 
shocks . This suggests that such operations should be carried out in a 
centralized fashion, with their monetary effects nonetheless being 
uniformly spread through the Union . 
To conclude, although complex technical issues are involved in 
comparing the merits of alternative models for the execution of future 
monetary policy, it is not unreasonable to expect that an evolutionary 
model is chosen which, starting from a relatively higher degree of 
decentralisation, can evolve over time towards a more centralised system. 
While open market operations are likely to be the main instrument for 
regulating liquidity conditions, as is now the case in most European 
countries , reserve requirements cum standing facilities could play a more 
important role in the early , rather than the later stages of EMU . 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined a number of issues regarding recent 
developments in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy 
with a strong, although not exclusive, European focu s .  In particular , we 
have concentrated , on the one hand, on describing recent constitutional 
changes as regards the objectives of monetary policy and the degree of 
political and functional autonomy of Central Banks ; and, on the other , on 
exploring several key strategic and tactical questions concerning the 
implemen�ation of monetary policy. While these issues are of importance 
in many countries , they are crucial in the European Union, where major 
changes in monetary policy are envisaged to take place following the 
establishment of EMU . 
Admittedly , our paper has been primarily taxonomic and 
descriptive. This is , in large part, because the constitutional changes 
involved, more autonomous Central Banks and EMU, are either very 
recent or still on-going. So there is, as yet, little room for econometric 
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testing, in so far as that is ever possible , whether such changes have 
improved the conduct of policy. 
There have been some concerns whether these changes made 
policies in New Zealand and Canada too deflationary initially . Yet it is 
remarkable how well the inflation targets in those countries , and in the 
UK , have so far been met . Sceptics would counter that neighbouring 
countries, without such direct inflation targets - e . g. Australia and the 
USA - have done broadly as well on this front. 
So the jury is still out . Nevertheless there is a continuing strong 
groundswell of support for moving both to more autonomous Central 
Banks and, within the European Union , to EMU . We believe that the case 
for such autonomy is greatly enhanced if it is accepted that Central Banks 
have a single medium-term objective, i .  e .  price stability. It facilitates 
delegation, and enhances accountability . This notwithstanding, it must 
be acknowledged that the economically beneficial effects from clarifying 
the objectives of monetary policy and from granting greater Central Bank 
autonomy will be all the greater if fiscal policy is not at odds with 
monetary policy. Indeed, as established by economic principles and 
confirmed by experience, the anti-inflationary credibility of monetary 
policy does not depend only on the autonomy of the Central Bank but on 
the coherence and credibility of the overall macroeconomic policy . For 
this reason, it is of fundamental importance that the policies of both 
autonomous Central Banks and of the fiscal authorities be closely 
coordinated towards the pursuit of the overall goal of sustained non­
inflationary growth. Finally , judging by experience, the favourable 
impact of improvements in national monetary constitutions has tended to 
be greater when such constitutional changes have reflected society's 
concern about inflation and awareness that high inflation is not conducive 
- but is actually detrimental - to economic growth . 
We have also discussed at some length the alternative between 
having as the primary target a direct inflation objective or an intermediate 
( monetary) target . We would not, however, want to leave the impression 
that the alternatives are either sharp , or mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
any country pursuing a quantified objective will keep a close eye on a 
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range of intermediate information variables ; any country choosing an 
intermediate target will be greatly concerned about the (time-varying) 
relationships between that target and the outcome for the final (inflation) 
objective . 
Finally , we would like to mention that recent constitutional 
changes ,  by providing a more solid and transparent medium-term 
framework for monetary policy, where price stability is clearly established 
as its primary objective and where the ability of Central Banks to pursue 
this objective without political interference is enhanced, may increase 
flexibility concerning the adoption of specific monetary policy strategies 
and tactics . As has been recently pointed out ( Crockett, 1993 ) ,  this new 
institutional framework could provide a useful synthesis between rules 
and discretion which could reinforce the medium-term anti-inflationary 
credibility of monetary policy while allowing for the appropriate degree 
of flexibility in the shorter-term setting of targets and instruments . 
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